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Plaintiffs-Appellees Clark hereby answer the petition for
rehearing filed by Royal K. Hunt.
I.

THE PETITION FOR REHEARING WAS UNTIMELY FILED.

The opinion from this court was issued and entered Friday,
August 30, 1991.

Rule 3 5(a) Utah R. App. P., states:

A rehearing will not be granted in the absence
of a petition for rehearing. A petition for
rehearing may be filed with the clerk within
14 days after the entry of the decision of the
court, unless the time is shortened or
enlarged by order.
Hunt

did

not

lodge

his

petition

for

rehearing

until

September 16, 1991, seventeen days after this court's decision was
entered.

Based upon Rule 35, the petition had to be filed by

Friday, September 13, 1991. Since the petition was untimely filed,
a rehearing should not be granted.
II.

HUNT HAS NO STANDING TO CONTEST THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT.

In his petition Hunt first claims that the default judgment
had been assigned to Myers, who could proceed in the action in the
name of Booth pursuant to Rule 25(c), U.R.C.P.

This is not a new

argument and is covered extensively in Appellee-Clark's brief in
point V (page 26) .

Hunt argues, however, that upon receiving

notice, Myers did not appear at the rehearing to set aside the
judgment because Meyer did not believe that the rehearing was "a
meaningful hearing at a meaningful time and would not be served by
a post-vacation remedy."

(Petition, p. 4.)
1

To properly analyze Hunt's position, it is important to first
understand the parties and their representation.
petition "pro se" in behalf of himself.

Hunt filed this

Hunt's right and standing

to raise issues in the petition are therefore restricted to his
personal involvement in the case as a party.

As this Court

recognized in its decision, Hunt's personal interest arises only
out of an assignment of a trust deed by Associate Financial
Services, which assignment took place in February, 1988.

Before

this time, there is no evidence of any kind that Hunt had any
personal interest in the property, in the counter-claim or in any
other matter involved in the litigation. His prior involvement was
as an attorney for Booth and/or Myers.
The default judgment was taken in April, 1987, and was set
aside in August, 1987, approximately 6 months before Hunt had any
personal interest in the case.

Associates never claimed any

interest in the counterclaim filed by Booth. Therefore, Hunt (pro
se) has no standing to challenge any part of this Court's or the
trial court's ruling regarding the setting aside of the default
judgment.
III. MYERS HAS WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO THE SETTING ASIDE OF
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
Even though Hunt filed this petition in behalf of himself only
and even though Myers was not a party to this appeal, Hunt
nonetheless argues in behalf of Myers that this Court should
consider Myers' position because Myers could proceed in the name of
2

Booth, the original judgment creditor-

Clarks strenuously object

to Hunt indirectly representing Myers even though he claims not to
represent Myers.
One of the most difficult aspects of this case has been Mr.
Hunt's evasiveness and inconsistent positions.

For example, when

plaintiffs moved to set aside the default judgment, Hunt appeared
and indicated that he did not represent Myers, but suggested to the
court that there may be a due process problem since the court had
not given notice of the motion to Myers.

This representation was

made, despite the fact that Hunt was assisting Myers in the
execution issued from the default judgment. Thereafter when Myers
and Hunt were again served with notice of a rehearing on the Motion
to Set Aside, neither he nor Myers appeared or objected.

After

this Court rendered its decision that Myers thereby waived his
right to challenge the order setting aside the judgment, Hunt now
represents Myers' position that there has been no waiver.

Hunt

conveniently disclaims or represents the interests of various
parties, depending upon what position is convenient for his current
argument.
Hunt's argument fails for other reasons as well.

Rule 25(c)

U.R.C.P. indicates that if an interest is assigned, the assignee
may proceed under the assignor's name.

However, Booth made a

formal assignment to Myers that was filed as a matter of record (R.
44-45) Therefore, Myers was the interested party of record, and by
failing to object at the hearing or by failing to appeal the order
3

setting aside the judgment, Myers has no claim through Hunt's
petition for rehearing; nor does

Hunt have any right of any kind

to assert Myers' claim herein.
Finally, Hunt argues that, "Myers did not appear [at the
second hearing on the Motion to Set Aside] because due process
would require notice and a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time
and would not be served by a post-vacation remedy."

(Petition, p.

4) There is no evidence whatsoever to support the factual basis of
this statement, since Myers never appeared at any time before the
trial court or before this Court.
false.

In any event, the assertion is

There was nothing unmeaningful about the hearing or time

provided to Myers to appear and present his case regarding why the
default judgment should not be set aside. The prior order setting
aside the judgment was not a final order and could have easily been
vacated or modified.
IV.

HUNT'S RULE 11 SANCTION IS NOT "DOUBLE RECOVERY."

Hunt next argues that the motion for sanction was actually a
"motion for fees already included in the decree," (Petition p. 5)
and the sanction is therefore double recovery.

A quick perusal of

the record will show this statement is untrue.

The motion for

sanctions,

order

memorandum

in

support

and

court

clearly

demonstrate that the motion was not used as a guise for some other
purpose.

The sanction was a punishment, not a compensatory award.

It's purpose was to punish and discipline Hunt for violating Rule
4

11.

Since a sanction is not designed to compensate but to punish,

"double recovery11 is irrelevant. There is no authority whatsoever
that a sanction must be a set-off or a reduction from compensable
damages.

Otherwise the very purpose of Rule 11 (to punish) would

be frustrated.
V.

HUNT RAISES NO NEW ISSUE REGARDING THE CLAIM OF NONFINALITY OF THE FORECLOSURE ORDER.

The issue of non-finality of the foreclosure decree has been
fully briefed in the appellants and reply brief.

No new facts or

legal support have been advanced by Hunt in his petition.

This

Court has thoroughly examined Hunt's position on this issue and has
ruled.

It is a waste of judicial time to again revisit the same

issue without something significantly new being advanced.
VI.

THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD STAND.

Hunt asserts that, after Associates assigned its interest to
Hunt and he personally became a party on February 26, 1988, "he
made and filed any number of objections to the award of attorneys
fees."

(Petition, p. 8.)

This is not true and he gives no

citation to any record to support this allegation.

The award of

attorneys fees had been fully litigated and determined by the trial
court prior to February 1, 1988, when the judge executed the decree
of foreclosure.

It is true that Hunt objected to the award of

sanctions after February 1, 1988, however, there was no further
proceeding regarding the foreclosure fees.
5

As discussed above, a

sanction is not a compensatory award for attorneys fees.

An

objection to the sanction therefore is not an objection to the fees
awarded pursuant to the foreclosure action.
Concerning Booth's standing to challenge the attorneys fees,
Hunt asserts that Booth suffered actual injuries, yet cites nothing
in the

record

to

support

the

allegation.

Since

Booth had

transferred all of his interest in the property months before the
foreclosure action commenced and he therefore had no equity in the
property, he has no right to challenge any aspect of the fees and
expenses awarded by the court.

Hunt claims, however, that Booth

"was entitled to possession of the property" during relevant times.
Hunt again makes this allegation without any reference to the
record.

It was this same unfounded factual assertion that Judge

Frederick determined was untrue and was part of the basis for the
Rule 11 sanctions.
his petition.

Yet, Hunt continues to make this argument in

This claim, even if true, does not belong to Hunt.

Hunt's petition was filed only in behalf of himself "pro se," and
Hunt cannot properly raise this issue in behalf of Booth in any
event.
After arguing that Booth had an interest in the property, Hunt
then argues on page 10 of his petition that the attorneys fees were
improper because there were only four recorded interest holders in
the property (Gurr, the Lockhart Company, Draper Bank & Trust, and
Co-vest Corp.).

Thus only these four parties were necessary

parties in the foreclosure proceedings.
6

This statement confirms

that Hunt knew Booth did not have an interest in the property.
Hunt then represents that there is no evidence in the record to
support the court's assertion that there were other encumbrances
besides Gurr and Lockhart.

(Petition, p. 11.) This is also untrue

and was fully discussed in appellee's brief.

It was necessary for

plaintiffs to bring the foreclosure action against all of the named
defendants in order to obtain insurable title. See R. 220, 230-46,
292.
Assuming Hunt has the right to challenge the attorneys fees,
the mere assertion that there is insufficient evidence to support
the award is improperly made.

Hunt has not met his duty to

marshall all of the evidence which supports the judge's ruling as
required

on

appellate

review.

E.g.

Morgan

v.

Quailbrook

Condominium Co. , 704 P.2d 573, 577 n.3 (Utah 1985). There is ample
evidence to support the award, particularly in retrospect since
this matter has been appealed without an award of attorneys fees.
VII. BOOTH HAD NO INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY DURING RELEVANT
TIME PERIODS.
Hunt argues on page 12 of his petition that Booth's possessory
interest in the property is admitted in the record. Again, Hunt is
trying to argue the claim of Booth which he cannot do "pro se."
Putting that aside, this point illustrates more cogently why
sanctions were awarded against Hunt.
At the beginning when Hunt represented Booth, Hunt pursued a
bogus counter-claim, alleging that Booth held an interest in the
7

property and was damaged by the actions of the plaintiffs.

This

counter-claim was made despite the fact that Booth had transferred
all of her interest in the property many months before the alleged
wrongful actions by Clarks. Hunt then surreptitiously proceeded to
take default on the counter-claim and in silence, tried to execute
on the very property on which the Clarks were foreclosing.

Hunt

was cunningly taking away the Clarks' claim to foreclosure.

When

the default judgment and execution were discovered by Clarks, they
immediately moved to set aside the judgment.
improper notice to Myers.

Hunt then claimed

When proper notice to Myers was given,

Hunt then claimed the notice to be meaningless.

Then depositions

of Mr. and Mrs. Booth were taken and the testimony was unrefuted
and clear that Booth had no interest in the property after she had
transferred her interest in May, 1987, and under any circumstance,
Booth would have no interest at least by August, 1987 (months
before any alleged misconduct by the Clarks) when the property
again changed hands to another third party.
Based upon clear and unrefuted evidence by the Booths, Judge
Frederick awarded sanctions against Hunt and Booth for filing the
meritless counter-claim.

Thereafter, Hunt continued to assert the

validity of Booth's default judgment on appeal.

When this court

affirmed the lower court, Hunt again represents to the court,
"Booth held a possessory interest in the property upon which she
based her claims against plaintiffs. The allegations of possessory
interest is admitted in this record.11
8

Hunt cites no record nor is

there any record to support this contention.

On the contrary,

Booth's own testimony clearly establishes the contrary.
It appears that the sanctions against Mr. Hunt still have had
no effect.

Granting Hunt's petition for rehearing will only

reinforce Hunt's distorted perspective of filing meritless claims
and then trying to justify the wrongdoing by technicalities.
CONCLUSION
Hunt

filed this petition

positions of Booth or Myers.

"pro sefl

and

cannot argue the

The Court has fully considered and

addressed previously in its decision all issues raised by Hunt in
his petition.

This Court should therefore deny his petition for

rehearing.
DATED this jZ^May of December, 1991.

9
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING was mailed, postage
prepaid, this ^~D_ day of December, 1991, to:
Royal K. Hunt
356 South 200 #9
St. George, UT 84770
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